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Abstract
Ecological models are a fundamental tool that archaeologists use to clarify
our thinking about the processes that generate the archaeological record.
Typically, arguments reasoned from a single model are bolstered by observ-
ing the consistency of ethnographic data with the argument. This validation
of a model establishes that an argument is reasonable. In this paper, we at-
tempt to move beyond validation by comparing the consistency of two argu-
ments reasoned from different models that might explain corporate territorial
ownership in a large ethnographic dataset. Our results suggest that social
dilemmas are an under appreciated mechanism that can drive the evolution
of corporate territorial ownership. When social dilemmas emerge, the costs
associated with provisioning the public goods of information on resources
or, perhaps, common defense create situations in which human foragers gain
more by cooperating to recognize corporate ownership rules than they lose.
Our results also indicate that societies who share a common cultural history
are more likely to recognize corporate ownership, and there is a spatial dy-
namic in which societies who live near each other are more likely to recognize
corporate ownership as the number of near-by groups who recognize owner-
ship increases. Our results have important implications for investigating the
coevolution of territorial ownership and the adoption of food production in
the archaeological record.
Keywords: Ownership, Human ecology, Hunter-gatherer, Agriculture,
Food production, Coevolution
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1. INTRODUCTION1
Basic economic theory tells us that as resources become more dense and2
predictable, rational individuals in competition with each other maximize3
their fitness by claiming ownership and defending their ownership claims4
over resource locations (Brown, 1964; Dyson-Hudson and Smith, 1978). This5
model of economic defensibility is foundational to explanations for territorial6
ownership in hunter-gatherer societies (Baker, 2003; Cashdan, 1983; Dyson-7
Hudson and Smith, 1978; Kaplan et al., 2009; Kelly, 1995; Sealy, 2006; Smith,8
1988, 2012; Thomas, 1981; Zeder, 2012) and, increasingly, archaeological ex-9
planations for the adoption of agriculture (Bettinger et al., 2009; Bowles and10
Choi, 2013; Smith, 2012; Zeder, 2012). Despite the clear importance of the11
model of economic defensibility, arguments reasoned from this model have12
not been evaluated in comparison with arguments reasoned from alterna-13
tive models that might also explain why foragers adopt rules of territorial14
ownership. Such a comparison of arguments is epistemologically healthy.15
Observations consistent with a single argument tell us that the argument is16
reasonable, but, in complex systems, almost any reasonable argument will fit17
data to one degree or another. The key question is: Which argument best18
fits the available data?19
In this paper, we compare the relative consistency of two arguments that20
might explain the evolution of corporate territorial ownership in hunter-21
gatherer societies. These two arguments follow from the logic of the model22
of economic defensibility and a recent model of forager-resource coevolution23
(Freeman, 2014; Freeman and Anderies, 2012) that comes out of a deep intel-24
lectual tradition in resource economics and community ecology (Clark, 1976;25
Noy-Meir, 1975). The goal of this comparison is to develop a more robust26
corpus of knowledge about the mechanisms that may lead foragers to adopt27
the corporate ownership of territories. In turn, we argue that this knowledge28
provides a basis for asking more nuanced questions about the archaeological29
record. In what follows, we define the basic problem of corporate territorial30
ownership. Next, we describe the model of economic defensibility (MED) and31
the foraging effort model (FEM). We describe these two models to elucidate32
why the models suggest different arguments for the evolution of territorial33
ownership. Finally, we conduct an analysis of corporate ownership rules in34
a global ethnographic database in an attempt to identify which argument is35
more consistent with the data.36
The results of our analysis indicate that the emergence of social dilemmas37
2
drives up the costs associated with the exchange of information on the pre-38
dictability of resources within a territory. This mechanism plays a heretofore39
under appreciated role in the adoption of rules of corporate ownership by pop-40
ulations of foragers. Our results also suggest that while ecological conditions41
have an immediate impact on the costs and benefits of territorial ownership,42
cultural transmission may have a longer-term effect on corporate territorial43
ownership. In a positive feedback loop, once foragers in particular locations44
begin to recognize territorial ownership, this recognition of new social rules45
exerts pressure on nearby groups to also adopt territorial ownership. Why46
this is the case requires further investigation. Our results have important47
implications for recent arguments in the archaeological literature that the48
adoption of territorial ownership by foragers was a necessary condition for49
the adoption of agriculture.50
2. MODELS, ARGUMENTS & TERRITORIAL OWNERSHIP51
AMONG FORAGERS52
By the term “model” we mean the abstract description of relationships53
between variables in a system. Models may be verbal descriptions or formal54
equations, but in either case, they are tools for clarifying one’s thinking about55
the interaction of variables in a system. The model of economic defensibility56
(MED) and foraging effort model (FEM) are similar models in that they both57
describe the relationships between the density of resources, competition for58
resources, and the predictability of resources. As such, we view these models59
as tools that help one propose explanations for some set of phenomena. By60
explanation we mean an argument that states the conditions under which a61
phenomenon will and will not occur; in this case, the phenomenon is corpo-62
rately recognized territorial ownership. We belabour the above distinction to63
point out that our analysis is an attempt to compare alternative arguments64
that might explain the evolution of territorial ownership. The two arguments65
were arrived at via an analysis of the MED and FEM respectively, but it is66
conceivable that arguments other than the two we describe below could be67
reasoned from an analysis of each model.68
2.1. Territorial ownership69
We define territorial ownership as the social norms that define access to70
a territory for some and limit access for others. Territories for our purposes71
are collections of habitats in which foragers might reside, and habitats are72
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collections of patches that contain many different types of resources. In an-73
thropology, the ownership of territory is often conceptualized as a continuum74
from open access at one pole to private property at the other pole (Smith,75
1988). Here, we start from a different premise. Rather than a continuum,76
we suggest that hunter-gatherers have nested sets of contingent norms that77
define the ownership of resources and territories. This means that multiple78
rules of ownership may exist simultaneously and apply at different levels of79
social organization. Which rule is activated depends on context and negoti-80
ation.81
The most basic rule of “ownership” in forager societies is that individual82
foragers own the resources that they harvest. Steward (1938, p. 253) de-83
scribes this norm among the Western Shoshoni, “But once work had been84
done upon the products of natural resources they became the property of the85
person or family doing the work.” In any society there are multiple compet-86
ing norms that may apply in a given situation, so just because we propose87
that hunter-gatherers have a basic norm of ‘you harvest it, you own it’ does88
not mean that this norm will always be activated. Sharing norms, in the89
correct context, may supersede the individual ownership norm of ‘you har-90
vest, you own’. For example, when Hadza foragers harvest berries outside of91
their overnight camps, the rule of ‘you harvest, you own’ applies; however, if92
berries are transported back to camp, individuals share their harvests more93
frequently (Marlowe, 2010, p. 237). There is a huge literature on when and94
why individuals share. Our point here is not to address this literature, we95
simply note that there is a basic norm of individual ownership of harvested96
food, but whether or not this norm is activated depends on competing norms97
of sharing and reciprocity. In societies in which the only ownership rule in98
place is the contingent: ‘you harvest, you own’ rule, territories are open99
access, while individual resources are contingently owned once harvested.100
Our concern in this paper is to assess competing explanations of the101
processes that lead hunter-gatherers to adopt rules of corporately recognized102
territorial ownership. Practically, this means the adoption of a rule by social103
groups in which access to a territory is limited for individuals who are not104
members of the social group. This is a situation that requires cooperation;105
the exclusion of non-group members may be enforced by territorial defense106
(i.e., attacking intruders) or requiring participation in a ritual or ceremony107
to gain access to a territory. Both of these activities are common ways of108
insuring compliance with a social norm in human societies (Bicchieri, 2006).109
For example, Ray (1963, p. 201) tells us that territorial “boundaries were110
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precisely defined and understood by the Modoc and transgression meant111
war.” This is clearly a case of a group defined territorial boundary. However,112
among the Modoc, the contingent rule of ‘you harvest, you own’ still applied.113
Individuals and families, for example, were the recognized owners of the roots114
and tubers that they dug for winter storage (Ray, 1963, p. 163), but cases115
of illness would invoke norms that put pressure on families to share their116
food supplies. Other examples of a corporately recognized rule of territorial117
ownership include the Tiwi, among who “the band was the land-owning,118
workaday, territorially organized group which controlled the hunting, the119
food supply and the warfare” (Hart and Pilling, 1965, p. 13). According to120
Steward (1938, p. 255), the Owens Valley Paiute “were distinctive for their121
band ownership of hunting and seed territories.”122
In a small number of hunter-gatherer societies recorded ethnographically,123
we see three or possibly more norms of ownership over territory and re-124
sources in coexistence. Corporately recognized norms of ownership, as those125
described above, may be augmented by additional norms that define the126
ownership of particular locations for smaller segments of society within cor-127
porately recognized territories. In this case, we see stable rights vested in128
smaller segments of a group to control access to particular locations. These129
rules exist alongside the rules that define group access and limits to territory,130
as well as the most basic rule of ‘you harvest, you own’. To illustrate, among131
the Clear Lake Pomo Gifford (1923, p. 81) writes,132
“Rattlesnake Island, on which was located the village of Elem,133
was communal property, and any villager might help himself to134
the acorns or other products of the island; not so on the mainland,135
however, which to the north, east and south was claimed by Elem,136
but was not communal property. It was divided into nearly ninety137
named tracts, owned by the various families of Elem.”138
Although the 90 tracts were owned by family groups, rights were in the oak139
trees on the land. Outside of the harvest season for acorns, individuals could140
transgress the boundaries of these tracts to hunt for game, and the hunter141
retained rights to the game (though other sharing norms might have existed142
upon transporting the game back to the village). In this example, we see143
three simultaneously present norms of resource and territorial ownership.144
The rule of ‘you harvest, you own’ is the most inclusive allowing access to145
resources for all members of Elem, but is only applicable to certain resources146
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in certain seasons, in the example above, deer. The rule of corporate owner-147
ship defines rights for members of Elem to exclude members of other social148
groups. Finally, the family ownership rule defines access to particular oak149
groves for some families of Elem and limits access for others. Importantly,150
this rule depends on the corporate ownership rule, because individuals from151
“competing” villages could transgress the oak grove of a family without fear152
of reprisal if the corporate norm was not in place. It is the corporate norm153
that creates a context in which families can claim the ownership of specific154
oak groves within the larger territory.155
In sum, there is a clear difference between the contingent ‘you harvest, you156
own’ rule and the ownership of territory by a social group. In the ownership157
of territory by a social group, individuals must engage in collective action158
to “own” territory. Individuals must also patrol or monitor for intruders159
and potentially sanction intruders to maintain the integrity of territorial160
boundaries for everyone in a group.161
3. THE MED162
Although there are other approaches, evolutionary anthropologists and163
archaeologists have relied on the MED to develop an explanation for terri-164
torial ownership by social groups in hunter-gatherer societies (Kelly, 1995;165
Thomas, 1981; Smith, 2012; Zeder, 2012). The MED was introduced into166
cultural anthropology by Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978). Dyson-Hudson167
and Smith (1978) argue that the ownership of territories by humans is the168
outcome of a continuum of trade-offs between the density and predictability169
of resources and the fitness benefits derived from territorial ownership and170
defense by individuals. In this argument, the density and predictability of171
resources determines the the amount of territory that an individual needs to172
secure resources. Holding competition for an area equal, in locations where173
resources are dense and predictable, the area required for an individual to174
maximize her rate of energy gain should decline (Dyson-Hudson and Smith,175
1978). In turn, the net benefits of patrolling and defending a territory from176
challengers should increase and individuals who adopt such behaviours can177
increase their fitness relative to individuals who do not. Thus, territorial own-178
ership provides a net fitness benefit for individuals as resources become more179
dense and predictable in space and time, assuming there are a sufficient num-180
ber of intruders to defend a territory against (Baker, 2003; Dyson-Hudson181
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and Smith, 1978; Kelly, 1995; Smith, 1988, 2012; Zeder, 2012). For clarity182
of presentation, we call this the area reduction argument.183
Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978) use Steward’s data on ethnographically184
observed hunter-gatherers in the Great Basin of North America to evalu-185
ate their argument for the evolution of ownership and suggest that their186
argument fits the data. The fit between Steward’s observations and their187
argument is a data matching exercise. The exercise establishes that the188
area reduction argument is reasonable; however, it does not actually test the189
argument in a substantive way because there is no alternative. One of the po-190
tential short comings of the Dyson-Hudson and Smith (1978) data matching191
exercise is that there is a range of demographic and technological variation192
among the societies discussed. For example, the Owens Valley Paiute bands193
are said to own territory because they exploit dense and predictable grass194
seeds which are made dense and predictable by irrigation. This begs the195
question of whether ownership preceded irrigation or whether irrigation pre-196
ceded ownership? The answer matters because some other process may have197
led to the adoption of band ownership, which, in turn, provided an incentive198
for irrigation, which, in turn, made grass seeds more dense and predictable.199
The sample of societies in their analysis is not large enough to answer such200
questions.201
In a very influential assessment of the area reduction argument Cashdan202
(1983) studied the territoriality of hunter-gatherers living in the Kalahari203
Desert of Southern Africa. Contrary to her expectations reasoned from the204
area reduction argument, Cashdan (1983) found that foragers more tightly205
controlled access to their territory as rainfall and, by inference, resources be-206
came more unpredictable within a territory. Specifically, the !Ko more tightly207
controlled access to their territory via what Cashdan calls social boundary208
defense. This occurs when individuals engage in rituals and/or ceremonies to209
ask permission to use a territory. Cashdan’s work (1983) illustrates that rules210
of territorial ownership by social groups may be activated in two ways: 1) by211
sanctioning or perimeter defense or 2) by social integration through rituals212
in which individuals from different social groups recognize their common in-213
terest in recognizing territorial ownership. These findings are well supported214
by research in behavioural economics on norm activation (Bicchieri, 2006).215
At first glance, Cashdan’s results contradict the area reduction argument.216
However, Smith (1988) and Kelly (2013, p. 161-162) argue that her results217
provide a context for extending the area reduction argument rather than a218
critical test (and we concur). They argue that, holding competition equal,219
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where resources are dense but vary in such a way that the productivity of220
“competing” group’s territories are anti-correlated, there is a net fitness ben-221
efit for individuals to engage in territorial ownership based on social bound-222
ary defense. The key is that the productivity of competing group’s territories223
are anti-correlated, which provides an incentive for individuals in competing224
groups to recognize each other’s ownership claims (Cashdan, 1983; Smith,225
1988). This is a perfectly reasonable extension of the area reduction argu-226
ment, but it has not been evaluated against other arguments nor has a data227
matching exercise been conducted with respect to this possibility. Again, in228
this example the sample of societies studied was very small. A larger sample229
might reveal that the !Ko are a very interesting outlier.230
4. THE FEM231
The FEM formally studies the feedback between the fraction of an in-232
dividual’s time budget devoted to the harvest of resources and the mean233
resource density of an area over time. The model is a tool that facilitates234
the study of how individual foraging decisions scale-up to effect the dynamics235
of resources at the system level, and, in turn, how resource dynamics feed-236
back down to impact the costs and benefits of individual foraging strategies.237
Our study of this feedback process suggests to us an alternative argument238
that may explain the adoption of territorial ownership by social groups. For239
clarity of presentation, we call this the common pool resource dilemma argu-240
ment. More details on the model are available in the supplemental file and241
in the following sources: Freeman (2014) & Freeman and Anderies (2012).242
The FEM describes a baseline forager-resource system. By this we mean243
that a resource location is treated as open access with the simple rule of244
‘you harvest, you eat.’ We use our knowledge of the model’s dynamics to245
develop an argument that describes the conditions under which a baseline246
system might change and individuals might cooperate to adopt a corporate247
rule that restricts access to a territory.248
The key dynamic in the FEM that is relevant here is as follows. Holding249
all other parameters equal, as the mean productivity of resources in a habitat250
declines or population density increases, foragers maintain a consistent sup-251
ply of food because each individual works a little bit harder (i.e., spends more252
time harvesting food) to meet their desired amount of food (Freeman and253
Anderies, 2012). However, this strategy of working a bit harder generates254
a particular kind of non-linear behaviour in the system known as multiple255
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stable states. In this case, one stable state is a productive or benign state256
(also known as an attractor). The other stable state or attractor is a de-257
graded state. In their simplest form, attractors define collections of stable258
equillibria that characterize the long-run evolution of a system. An equilib-259
rium is a unique solution to a set of equations. When we refer to states or260
attractors, we are referring to properties of the model. Real forager-resource261
systems constantly change but may settle into regimes that approximate sta-262
ble states, as we use the term here (Scheffer and Carpenter, 2003). The263
concept of multiple stable states provides a powerful paradigm to help us264
think about change in real systems as potentially dichotomous and punc-265
tuated rather than smooth and continuous (see e.g., Anderies et al., 2002;266
Janssen et al., 2003; Lade et al., 2013; Lever et al., 2014; May et al., 2008;267
Scheffer et al., 2012; Staver et al., 2011).268
In the Freeman and Anderies (2012) model, in the productive state, the269
foraging strategy of meeting resource needs with minimum effort is tenable270
(i.e., harvest as efficiently as possible until food needs are met, then stop271
and devote the remainder of one’s time budget to other activities). In the272
degraded state this is not possible. A forager must constantly look for food273
just to stay alive, and a forager’s time budget is exhausted just to subsist274
(this is analogous to a “poverty trap” in economics). When the FEM is char-275
acterized by both a productive and a degraded stable state, every forager is276
susceptible to short-term environmental variation (like a drought or immigra-277
tion event) that can flip a forager-resource system from the productive to the278
degraded state. For example, a drought could cause the productivity of food279
in a habitat to drop below the long-term mean productivity of the habitat;280
this, in turn, induces individuals to increase the time they spend harvesting281
food (Freeman and Anderies, 2012, p. 431-432) causing a “flip” into the de-282
graded state. Importantly, the presence of multiple stable states means that283
this flip from productive to degraded circumstances can be punctuated (i.e.,284
occur much more rapidly than a model without multiple stable states would285
permit) and difficult for individuals to anticipate because of the uncertainty286
generated by the delayed feedback between past foraging decisions and the287
current state of a resource base (Freeman and Anderies, 2012, p. 431).288
4.1. The common pool resource dilemma argument289
In an environment where forager-resource systems are susceptible to flip-290
ping into a degraded state, foragers face a commons dilemma. In the FEM,291
habitats are open access. As long as the productive state is the only stable292
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long-run equilibrium in the system, treating a habitat as open access works293
just fine. However, holding all other parameters constant, once the mean294
productivity of a habitat decreases or population density increases past a295
critical threshold, the degraded state emerges. Now, depending on how eco-296
logical conditions vary, foragers might occupy a productive or a degraded297
state. The commons dilemma arises because it is in each forager’s interest to298
work hard enough to obtain their desired amount of food from a habitat, but299
the effects of this scale-up and create the risk that all foragers in the system300
will not achieve their desired level of food due to a shock (like a drought)301
that induces the system to flip into a degraded state. As noted above, such302
a transition may be very difficult to anticipate. When individuals cannot303
anticipate such a transition, the ability to know where other foragers are304
located on the landscape becomes paramount, because they are a potential305
perturbation which may generate a critical transition from the productive to306
the degraded state.307
Our basic argument is that the emergence of common pool resource dilem-308
mas where none had previously existed stresses the ability of foragers to up-309
date their information about the state of resources in an environment. In310
such an ecological setting, individuals have a choice: Either continue with311
business as usual and risk experiencing localized “tragedies of the commons”312
or cooperate to manage the pressure on various resource locations tempo-313
rally, limiting who, when and where resources may be harvested via more314
investment in ownership. This second option decreases the amount of effort315
that individuals must invest in the collection of information and increases the316
reliability of the information that individuals have on the location of others.317
Although it is costly to develop and maintain ownership rules, such rules318
decrease the complexity of information that individuals must collect and in-319
terpret to reliably plan how to use a landscape and avoid the fitness costs320
associated with a tragedy of the commons (see also Supporting Information).321
For example, in their study of the role of information in Kua foraging322
strategies, Hitchcock and Ebert (2006, p. 146-147) state:323
“prior to the seasonal breakup of hunter-gatherer groups, the lo-324
calities to be occupied by various family units were surveyed. The325
resources available in the area to which people might move were326
assessed carefully, as were the current states of occupancy, use327
and sentiments about resource sharing among groups that had328
rights to that area. Once this process was complete, the rela-329
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tive advantages and disadvantages of the alternative places were330
exhaustively discussed prior to reaching a consensus on what op-331
tions should be persued.”332
This passage illustrates the central importance of information collection333
and interpretation to plan out a sequence of movements in space and time to334
gain access to resources. Our argument is that once common pool resource335
dilemmas are characteristic of a forager-resource system, this scout, discuss,336
and then execute residential movements strategy is stressed. The emergence337
of multiple stable states in the potential habitats of a group’s territory makes338
the time necessary to scout and discuss where to move next longer and,339
depending on how unpredictable shocks are that hit a territory, this process of340
decision making may be less effective at planning out residential movements.341
That is, people make a decision about which habitat it is best to move342
into, but end up in a ‘bad spot’ (i.e., a degraded harvest state and need343
to unexpectedly move on). These mechanisms, (more time required to get344
information and less reliable information) provide an incentive for foragers345
to adopt strategies for reducing these costs. In this argument, the ownership346
of territory regulates the movement of foragers in and out of a territory and347
is beneficial to each individual because it reduces the costs associated with348
obtaining reliable information on the quality of resource locations.349
To revisit Cashdan’s (1983) excellent paper, perhaps the reason the !Ko350
most restrict access to their territory is explained by our argument. The351
!Ko live in an environment where the mean rainfall is lower and inter-annual352
variation in rainfall is higher than the other Bushmen group’s that Cashdan353
(1983, p. 51) investigated. This suggests that a) the !Ko are more suscep-354
tible from year-to-year to realizing a common pool resource dilemma than355
the other groups and b) the uncertainty associated with the distribution of356
resources is high. In short, the !Ko live in a territory where there is more357
stress on the ability of individuals to process information about their ability358
to move between habitats and find the anticipated resources relative to the359
other groups in Cashdan’s study. Thus, it is in every individual’s interest to360
cooperate to recognize territorial ownership and control the flow of foragers361
from other groups into the territory. It is in the interest of foragers from362
other groups to recognize such claims because to shirk them would give the363
!Ko ample reason not to provide information on the quality of resource loca-364
tions that the “intruders” might want to use. We believe this is a reasonable365
argument. However, we want to do more than establish that an argument is366
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reasonable. Our goal is to use data to evaluate which argument is more rea-367
sonable or if neither argument adequately explains patterns in a large sample368
of ethnographic cases.369
5. PREDICTIONS370
The purpose of this section is to summarize the predictions that follow371
from the logic of the area reduction and common pool resource arguments.372
We highlight predictions that are mutually exclusive because these are key373
to determining which argument is most consistent with the data.374
5.1. Area reduction argument375
The area reduction argument suggests eight basic predictions (see Table 2376
below for a summary). First, holding all else equal, as the density of resources377
in an environment increases, the likelihood that hunter-gatherer groups are378
recorded to corporately own territories should increase. This should occur379
because as the density of resources increases, individuals should need less area380
to harvest food and the net benefit of territorial ownership should increase.381
In forager societies, the density of exploited resources is a function of diet382
(i.e., the foods that foragers primarily target) and the growth rate (biomass383
growth per unit time) of resources. As biomass accumulates at a faster rate,384
resource density should increase and the likelihood that hunter-gatherers own385
territories should also increase.386
Second, in terms of diet, some argue that aquatic resources (fish and shell387
fish) provide dense and predictable resources (Hamilton et al., 2007; Sealy,388
2006) and this allows individual foragers to decrease the size of their territory.389
If this assertion has merit, the reduction in territory size should increase the390
net benefit of territorial ownership. Holding all else equal, we might then391
expect that an increase in the exploitation of aquatic resources increases the392
likelihood that hunter-gatherer groups own territory.393
Third, the predictability of resources within a territory is a function of394
intrinsic variation in the basic physical inputs that determine the productivity395
of resources, such as temperature and rainfall. Again, centris peribus we396
expect that as the inter-annual coefficient of variation associated with rainfall397
increases, terrestrial resources become less predictable and the likelihood that398
hunter-gatherers recognize the corporate ownership of territories declines.399
Following the logic of the area reduction argument, this should occur because400
it is costly for individuals to invest in the ownership of habitats that are401
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unpredictably devoid of food and, therefore, the net benefit of owning a402
territory declines as resources become less predictable (Dyson-Hudson and403
Smith, 1978).404
Fourth, following the dynamics proposed by the MED, we expect that the405
density and predictability of resources interact to amplify the area require-406
ments for individuals to obtain food. In other words, given a sufficient level407
of competition, as the density of resources goes up in conjunction with an408
increase in the predictability of rainfall, we expect that the positive effects409
of resource density and predictability on the likelihood of ownership increase410
in strength as resources become simultaneously more predictable and dense.411
We expect this because the territory needed per forager should decline at an412
amplifying rate as the resources within territories become more dense and413
predictable, allowing foragers to maximize their fitness through corporate414
control of reliable and productive territories.415
Fifth, the area reduction argument suggests that ownership should only416
occur when there is someone to defend a territory against (Brown, 1964).417
Holding other factors constant, as population density increases, the likeli-418
hood that foragers have someone to defend resources against should increase,419
and foragers should make and defend ownership claims. Sixth, accounting420
for the interaction of competition and resource density, we also expect to see421
a threshold effect. Where competition is very low, we should observe that422
resource density has a negligible effect on the likelihood of ownership. How-423
ever, as completion increases, we should observe an increasingly strong and424
positive effect of resource density on the likelihood of ownership. Seventh,425
the same prediction also applies to the predictability of resources within a426
territory. At low levels of competition, the effect of resource predictability427
is negligible because their is no one to defend against. As competition in-428
creases, an increase in the predictability of resources should have a positive429
and increasingly strong effect on the likelihood of ownership.430
Finally, in human societies competition may take the from of attacks431
made by coalitions through warfare and raiding. All else being equal, we432
expect that foragers are more likely to own territories as the frequency of433
warfare/raiding increases, again, provided there are dense and predictable434
resources worth owning. If such resources were unavailable, then foragers435
may simply cede control of marginal territory and move elsewhere. We also436
suspect that there might be similar interaction effects between warfare, re-437
source density and the predictability of resources as those described above438
in conjunction with population density.439
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5.2. Common pool resource argument440
As above, the phrase “holding all else equal” applies to each of the pre-441
dictions below, and we predict the potential interaction effects suggested442
by the dynamics of the FEM. First, as the productivity of terrestrial re-443
sources declines, the likelihood that hunter-gatherer groups own territories444
should increase. The dynamics of the FEM indicate that as the growth rate445
of resources declines, a forager-resource system becomes more vulnerable to446
environmental variation that may generate a flip from the productive to de-447
graded harvest state for all foragers (i.e., a tragedy of the commons). This448
should create an environment that favours the selection of rules of ownership449
by foragers as one way to isolate a territory from indirect competition and450
reduce the information processing costs associated with choosing where to451
locate in space and time to harvest food. Please note that this prediction is452
the opposite of what we expect based on the area reduction argument.453
Second, a related argument in the hunter-gatherer literature is that hunter-454
gathers increase their use of aquatic resources in response to the depression455
of terrestrial resources (Binford, 2001; Keeley, 1995). Given that, as noted456
above, aquatic resources are potentially productive and reliable resources,457
then as terrestrial resources become less productive relative to population458
density, the emergence of multiple stable states and associated risks may459
stimulate individuals to shift toward aquatic resources and invest in isolating460
these resources from competition. In essence, the combination of aquatic461
resource use and ownership could begin to decouple individual foragers from462
the risk of getting flipped into a degraded harvest state in a terrestrial re-463
source system. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the use of464
aquatic resources and the adoption of territorial ownership. Importantly,465
we expect the positive effect of fishing to occur in tandem with a negative466
association between the productivity of terrestrial resources and territorial467
ownership.468
Third, the common pool resource argument suggests that increasingly469
unpredictable terrestrial resources creates an environment in which the ben-470
efits outweigh the costs of adopting territorial ownership. Holding all else471
equal, an increase in the variance of resource productivity should increase472
the chances that a group of foragers experience a flip from a productive to a473
degraded state. For example, any environment will have a long-term mean474
rainfall. As the variance associated with inter-annual rainfall increases, the475
intensity of dry periods and the ability to predict which years will be dry476
should decline. In this situation, the benefits of adopting and following own-477
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ership rules that coordinate the use of territories should outweigh the costs478
because ownership decreases the effort needed to collect information on where479
other foragers are at on the landscape. In turn, more effort can be devoted to480
dealing with the rainfall induced risk of a system flipping into the degraded481
state, for example, investing in water management.482
Fourth, we expect that as population density increases, foragers are more483
likely to formally own territories. Here, just as with declines in the produc-484
tivity of resources, as population density increases, resource depletion causes485
a commons dilemma to emerge in a forager-resource system. The commons486
dilemma, in turn, is indicative of a system in which foragers are sensitive487
to flips between a degraded and productive states caused by environmental488
variation, like droughts or unexpected immigration events. Thus, as popula-489
tion density increases and depletion creates a commons dilemma, we expect490
that the net benefits of holding exclusive space increases because individuals491
can better estimate their risk of ending up in a degraded state when they can492
know with certainty where other foragers are likely to locate on a landscape493
(Charnov et al., 1976; Wilson et al., 1994).494
Fifth, as with the MED, we expect warfare to have a positive association495
with the likelihood that hunter-gatherers recognize corporate ownership. If496
foragers invest in corporate ownership institutions to help avoid a tragedy497
of the commons, then increased investment in warfare is likely necessary498
to protect and defend ownership claims. In other words, individuals invest499
in ownership to isolate resource locations from competition. In turn, this500
also requires cooperating to defend those ownership claims from outsiders501
through things like retaliatory raiding and attacking perceived intruders. In502
this case, we would expect the warfare does not interact in a significant way503
with other parameters to increase the likelihood of ownership because it is a504
consequence of the adoption of corporate ownership.505
Following the dynamics of the FEM we expect the following interaction506
effects between competition, resource density and predictability. Sixth, as507
resources become more dense and simultaneously more predictable, we should508
observe an increase in the strength of the negative effect of resource density509
on the likelihood of ownership. Seventh, as the density of resources declines,510
the strength of the negative effect of resource density on ownership should511
increase as population density increases. Following the common pool resource512
argument, a simultaneous decline in productivity and increase in population513
density should amplify the possibility that foragers will realize a common514
pool resource dilemma and get flipped into a degraded state. Thus, there515
15
will be a non-linear increase in selective pressure on foragers to recognize516
corporate ownership. Finally, as the predictability of resources increases,517
the strength of the positive effect of population density on ownership should518
decline. Again, the less variable the productivity of a territory from year-to-519
year, the less stress there is on the scout, discuss and execute a sequence of520
movements strategy discussed in the FEM section. Similarly, a simultaneous521
increase in population density coupled with a decrease in the predictability522
of resources should amplify the stress put on the ability of foragers to scout,523
discuss and execute a sequence of residential moves.524
6. Materials and Methods525
The ethnographic data used here were compiled from Binford (2001)526
(n=339 societies). The observations made on each society were collected527
from primary sources written by ethnographers working independently and528
at different times and places (Binford, 2001). No data are perfect, and the529
data used here are no different. However, the large sample size allows re-530
searchers to check the consistency of competing arguments with data, even531
if the ability to falsify an argument is uncertain. These data have been used532
productively in a similar manner (e.g., Fenner, 2005; Grove, 2009, 2010; Grove533
et al., 2012; Hamilton et al., 2007, 2009). The data set provided by Binford534
was collected independently of the arguments assessed in our analysis.535
To assess territorial ownership among hunter-gatherer societies, we use536
the variable recoded by Binford (2001, p. 426) called OWNERS. This vari-537
able is a description of territorial ownership, in terms of the presence of group538
recognized rules of ownership discussed above. There are four categories.539
Category 1) None reported, but all groups have identity and prac-540
tical links to both land and resources. There may be strong at-541
tachments in the form of persons seen as stewards of both land542
and lore. There are, however, no local group claims on the area543
in general (Binford, 2001, p. 426).544
None reported in this case does not mean the absence of any kind of owner-545
ship, only that definite rules for including and excluding members of social546
groups from a territory are not reported in ethnographic sources. For ex-547
ample, speaking of Shoshoni informants from Eastern California, Steward548
(1938, p. 73) states that they “all denied any form of family, village, or band549
ownership of seed lands. Although people from certain localities habitually550
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exploited the same areas, anyone was privileged to utilize territory ordinarily551
visited by other people.” Category 1 is a context in which territories are open552
access and the basic ‘you harvest, your own’ rule is contingently activated.553
Categories 2 and 3 describe very similar contexts of ownership.554
Category 2) The local group definitely claims exclusive use rights,555
over resource locations, residential sites, and the home range, in556
general. There may be a further set of claims among the house-557
holds or lineages within the local group– special trees, shell beds,558
etc. Category 3) Local group claims hunting areas, dominant an-559
imals, fishing sites and animal drive locations. Administration560
may be by a leader. Some resources may be said to be clan or561
lineage owned.562
The main difference between categories 2 and 3 is that Binford differentiates563
the particular resource locations (e.g., a fishing site) over which groups rec-564
ognize corporate ownership that restricts rights of access. He also stipulates565
that rights of access may be administered by a group leader in category 3.566
However, the ability to make a distinction between categories 2 and 3 is sus-567
pect, in our view. For example, the Modoc described earlier are an example568
of category 3. The Nomlaki are an example of category 2 in the Binford data569
set. Goldschmidt (1951, p. 332-333) states of Nomlaki ownership:570
“Ownership of land resided in the olkampa. Each olkampa usually571
owned a valley territory and another area in the mountains. Since572
the control and usage rested in the hands of the village chieftain,573
informants occasionally made reference to individual ownership.”574
He goes on to state that personal ownership could be claimed over the sea-575
sonal products of trees and fishing locations (Goldschmidt, 1951, p. 333).576
For our purposes, the fact that the distinction is fuzzy between these two577
categories is not as salient as the fact that categories 2 and 3 represent def-578
inite norms of ownership either by a settlement group or a band. This is a579
major difference from category 1 because it requires social groups to cooper-580
ate to legitimize access and the denial of access either through shared social581
conventions or through attacking intruders.582
Finally 28 societies in the data set are listed as category 4),583
Elite ownership of land and resources. In addition, there may be584
family claims to particular resource locations. Resource patches585
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may be owned by a family and can be given away, inherited or586
disposed of within the group.587
The major difference between categories 2 & 3 vs. 4 is the presence of inher-588
ited claims of ownership. In categories 2 and 3, social groups recognize their589
right to exclude others from their lands, but they do not recognize the ability590
of individuals or families to inherit and dispose of smaller segments of terri-591
tory nested within the group’s territory or home range. Again, Goldschmidt’s592
(1951, p. 333) Nomlaki informant states “everyone knows the trees that were593
his own property. There was no inheritance of trees.” This stands in contrast594
to the Clear Lake Pomo, discussed earlier, who are an example of a category595
4 society. Speaking of small tracks of forest nested within the larger village596
owned territory, Gifford (1923, p. 83) states: “Land was normally owned by597
males and transmitted to their male offspring.”598
We collapse the OWNERS variable into a binary indicator variable for599
the presence or absence of norms that define the corporate ownership of600
a territory. Category 1 above is indicative that territories are open access601
settings (indicator value of 0). In our terms, category 1 societies have the602
basic social norm of ‘you harvest, you own’, which, of course, is contingently603
activated based on factors such as the resource being harvested, where con-604
sumption takes place and the strength of sharing norms (see Hadza example605
earlier). Categories 2-4 indicate that territories are owned by social groups,606
either bands or villages. Again, in our terms, there are two nested rules:607
1) ‘you harvest, you own’ at the individual level and 2) the norm of corpo-608
rate rights to a territory. We have experimented with separating category609
4 from categories 2 & 3 and running a multinomial logistic regression. We610
find that this does not change our results. However, it is difficult to inter-611
pret the multinomial logistic regression in part because of the small sample612
of only 28 category 4 societies. We welcome follow-up analyses that look at613
different ways to measure the presence of a group recognized norm or ter-614
ritorial ownership at the village or band level. All groups in categories 2-4615
have such a basic norm, category 4 societies simply have additional norms616
that define the inheritance of smaller segments of territory within the group’s617
larger territorial unit.618
[Table 1]619
Five variables are used to evaluate our predictions (Table 1). Net primary620
productivity data were obtained from Grieser and colleagues (Grieser et al.,621
2006) from their study of global patterns of net primary productivity for the622
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Food and Agriculture Organization. Net primary productivity is a rate of623
biomass growth (see Odum and Barrett, 2002; Porter and Marlowe, 2007).624
We assume that the higher the rate of biomass growth in an environment,625
the higher the rate of growth for biomass that is useful as food. Of course,626
the relationship between the growth of biomass and biomass useful as food627
may be more complex. Ultimately, NPP is constrained toward the poles by628
temperature. However, in equatorial areas, different vegetation communities629
with large differences in standing biomass can have very similar values of net630
primary productivity. It is in equatorial areas where uncertainty about the631
relationship between NPP and food growth is probably highest. Understand-632
ing the relationship between the rate of biomass growth and the growth of633
biomass useful as food is an important direction for research to improve com-634
parative studies. The coefficient of inter-annual variation was calculated here635
from global, gridded precipitation means calculated between 1950 and 2000636
at a one decimal degree scale (Beck et al., 2004). The grid cell nearest to the637
centre of each group’s territory was used to estimate the coefficient of varia-638
tion in inter-annual rainfall experienced by each society. We assume that the639
higher the inter-annual coefficient of variation in rainfall, the more that the640
productivity of terrestrial biomass varies unpredictably from year-to-year.641
The frequency of warfare is estimated here by an ordinal warfare variable642
that estimates the frequency of fighting and raiding (Binford, 2001). 1) No643
organized competition. Success in armed conflict is not an accepted male644
role in the overall life of the people. 2) Conflict is continually present on645
an on-again/off-again basis. Accelerated raiding (i.e., tit-for-tat raiding that646
becomes progressively more encompassing) is not a normal condition. 3)647
Conflict is more common than in category two and there are unprovoked at-648
tacks on intruders. There is planned and tactically executed raiding on other649
groups not necessarily in the context of revenge or feuding. 4) Conflict is650
common in the region, but it may flare up to major proportions periodically.651
Goals are more commonly to plunder and take land or resources. 5) All the652
properties of category four but with the additional feature that such conflict653
is sustained and results in long-term expansion of groups at the expense of654
others.655
6.1. Methods656
We use multiple, binary logistic regression to relate the joint probability657
that a corporate ownership norm is either recorded or not recorded, i.e.,658
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P (Ownership = 1|x1, ...xi) = 1
(1 + e−(α+
∑
i
bixi))
(1)
where x1, ...xi refers to a given set of explanatory variables, α is a constant659
and bi is a coefficient associated with each variable. Equation 1 can be660
transformed into a general linear model using the so-called logit link function,661
such that662
ln(
pˆ
1− pˆ) = α +
∑
i
bixi (2)
where pˆ is the joint probability that a hunter-gatherer group is recorded to663
recognize a corporate ownership norm, given a set of explanatory variables.664
The coefficients in equation 3 describe the effect that a change in an665
explanatory variable has on the log-odds that a hunter-gatherer group is666
recorded to own territory. We assume that groups of hunter-gatherer societies667
are, a priori, independent of model parameters and are equally likely to have668
been recorded by ethnographers to own territory. We use model selection669
methods to evaluate the sign and relative importance of the explanatory670
variables (Johnson and Omland, 2004). We base our model selection and the671
analysis of the relative importance of the explanatory variables on the Akaike672
Information Criterion (AIC). AIC is a measure of the fit and complexity of673
a statistical model. The analytical procedure for estimating the sign and674
relative importance of each explanatory variable was conducted using the R675
computing environment (R Development Core Team, 2008).676
The procedure we used to estimate the sign and relative importance of677
the explanatory variables is as follows. First, the MuMin R package was678
used to calculate all potential binary logistic regression models for the set679
of independent explanatory variables on the response variable of territorial680
ownership. For example, when analysing the full data set of 339 societies,681
there are five potential explanatory variables (population density, warfare,682
net primary productivity, fishing and the coefficient of variation in rainfall).683
Thus, this procedure results in 32 candidate logistical regression models,684
including a “null” model that only includes an intercept. Second, each model685
is ranked according to its AIC value from lowest to highest AIC. The best686
model is the statistical model with the lowest AIC (i.e., the model that best687
balances fit and complexity). This ranking allows one to calculate the change688
in AIC, ∆i, as AICi−minAIC, where AICi is the AIC of a candidate model689
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under consideration and minAIC is the AIC of the model that best balances690
fit and complexity.691
Third, standardized Akaike weights, wi are calculated for each candidate692
model. Akaike weights summarize the likelihood that a given model is the693
best approximate fit, given the data. The Akaike weight is calculated by694
first determining the likelihood that a model is the best approximation to695
the data, which conveniently is: L(model|data) ∝ e0.5∆i . Next, the the sum696
of the likelihoods of all regression models is calculated. Then, the Akaike697
weight is simply wi =
e0.5∆i∑R
r=1
e0.5∆r
. The Akaike weight is used here to define698
a 95% confidence set of models; that is, the set of models that is likely to699
contain the regression model that is the best fit to the data.700
Fourth, the mean regression coefficient and standard error of each ex-701
planatory variable included in the 95% confidence set of models is calculated.702
The relative importance of each explanatory variable present in at least one703
regression model of the 95% confidence set is also calculated. The relative im-704
portance of an explanatory variable is simply the sum of the Akaike weights705
of each model in which a variable is present. For example, if the 95% confi-706
dence set of regression models contains three candidate models, each model707
with a weight of 0.40, 0.30 and 0.25, respectively, and population density is708
a parameter in the top two weighted models, then the relative importance of709
population density is 0.70 (0.40+0.30). If the percent of diet obtained from710
fishing were present in all three models, its importance measure would be711
0.95 (0.40+0.30+0.25). The summed Akaike weights estimate the relative712
likelihood that a parameter is included in the best regression model (i.e., the713
model closest to truly representing the data). In this hypothetical example,714
fishing is 1.37 times more likely than population density to have a true effect715
on the ownership of territory. The closer a variable’s importance measure716
is to 1, the more likely the variable is to have a true effect on the response717
variable, given the data and candidate set of regression models.718
7. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS719
Table 2 summarizes our expectations for the effects of ecological variables720
on the likelihood of ownership reasoned from the area reduction and common721
pool resource dilemma arguments, respectively. To assess these predictions722
we first conduct a preliminary analysis of interaction effects and the potential723
for bias introduced by autocorrelation.724
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7.1. Interaction effects725
The above procedure allows us to calculate what we call a baseline set of726
regression outputs (see Table S1 & S2). These baseline outputs treat each ex-727
planatory variable as an independent variable. However, as noted (Table 2),728
we expect that the explanatory variables may interact in predictable ways.729
To evaluate interaction effects, we followed the above procedure including all730
potential interaction effects of a variable in our analysis. For example, we731
first evaluated the effects of interacting the coefficient of variation in rainfall732
with each other parameter. This gave us 9 parameters (warfare, population733
density, fishing, net primary productivity, the coefficient of variation in rain-734
fall and C.V. rainfall interacted with each of the first four parameters) to735
run on our response variable (ownership). We recorded any interaction effect736
with a summed Akaike weight greater than or equal to 0.60 for the 95% con-737
fidence set of models as evidence of a potentially important interaction. Next738
we did the same thing for net primary productivity, which gave us 8 param-739
eters to run on our response variable (8 because we had already checked the740
interaction effect of C.V. rainfall and net primary productivity). Again, we741
recorded any interaction effect with a summed Akaike weight greater than742
or equal to 0.60. We followed this procedure for each variable. Our analy-743
sis indicates that two interaction effects are most likely (a summed Akaike744
weight ≥ 0.60) to partly determine the ownership of territory, C.V. rainfall745
interacted with population density and net primary productivity interacted746
with population density. Thus, our preliminary analysis indicates that net747
primary productivity and C.V. rainfall are very likely to interact with popu-748
lation density and effect the likelihood of ownership while the other variables749
in the analysis are highly unlikely to interact.750
Next, we run our four step procedure (outlined above) running all five751
independent parameters and the two most likely interaction effects on the752
probability of ownership. We call this output our “full regression output”753
(see Table S3 and S4). The best regression model in this analysis includes754
all seven parameters, the five independent parameters and our two most755
likely interaction parameters. However, when we examine the best regres-756
sion model in detail (i.e., the model with the lowest AIC), we observe two757
things. 1) A high degree of multicollinearity between population density758
and our two interaction parameters (Figure S5). This is a potential problem759
because multicollinearity can increase the standard error associated with a760
coefficient and bias the sign of a coefficient. Given that 0 falls within the761
95% confidence limit of the coefficient associated with population density,762
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we remove population density as an independent parameter to deal with the763
problem of excessive multicollinearity. 2) The coefficients for C. V. rainfall764
and net primary productivity also overlap with zero, so we remove these two765
variables as independent parameters.766
[Table 2]767
Below, we run our four step procedure to obtain what we call our “efficient768
regression output.” In this analysis, there are four parameters: warfare, the769
percent of diet from fishing, C.V. rainfall interacted with population density770
and net primary productivity interacted with population density (Tables S5771
& S6). To assess the effects of the interaction terms in the efficient regression772
output, we use effect plots. The effect plots allow us to observe the effect of773
population density on the probability of ownership holding the coefficient of774
variation in rainfall and net primary productivity equal. This is important775
because interaction effects can be non-linear and such processes can be missed776
by just observing the summary coefficient associated with an interaction777
parameter (Fox and Hong, 2009).778
7.2. Autocorrelation779
The use of logistic regression assumes that the ethnographic cases are780
independent. However, societies who live near each other or share a com-781
mon cultural history may be interdependent due to cultural transmission782
(Galton’s problem). By cultural transmission we mean a “process of social783
reproduction in which the culture’s technological knowledge, behavior pat-784
terns, cosmological beliefs, etc. are communicated and acquired” (Hewlett785
and Cavalli-Sforza, 1986, p. 922; see also Boyd and Richerson, 2004). This786
is a potential issue because when the observations in a logistic regression787
are not independent, the coefficients associated with parameters may be bi-788
ased upward, making it difficult to assess the consistency of our arguments789
with the data. Further, cultural transmission processes might create feed-790
backs between the adoption of corporate ownership and the likelihood that791
neighbours adopt corporate ownership rules. Such feedbacks could be an792
additional process that helps explain the presence of corporate ownership in793
the ethnographic record.794
To evaluate the potential for autocorrelation due to spatial proximity795
and/or shared cultural histories, we ran our four step procedure to evaluate796
the effects of warfare, the percent of diet from fishing, C.V. rainfall interacted797
with population density and net primary productivity interacted with pop-798
ulation density on the likelihood of ownership. The best model includes all799
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four parameters (Table S5). We then ran a Moran’s I test for autocorrelation800
on the residual deviances using a weighted distance matrix based on spatial801
distance and a matrix calculate based on linguistic difference (as an estimate802
of shared cultural history). In both cases, we identified an extremely weak803
but significant level of autocorrelation. Moran’s I was 0.12 (p ≤ 0.05) for our804
test of spatial autocorrelation and was 0.01 (p ≤ 0.05) for our test of network805
autocorrelation. This suggests that we need to account for spatial and net-806
work autocorrelation to fairly evaluate the area reduction and common pool807
resource arguments.808
To insure that our parameters are as free from bias a possible due to au-809
tocorrelation, we use a two stage regression model to incorporate the endoge-810
nous effect of spatial and linguistic proximity into our analysis (Dow, 2008).811
We first lag our ownership variable (i.e., multiply our dependent variable812
vector by a distance matrix) using a weighted distance matrix that combines813
both measures of spatial distance and linguistic difference to account for814
vertical and horizontal cultural transmission. We combined these matrices815
following the procedure outlined by (Dow, 2008, p. 412) (see supplemental816
file for details). Here, the best combination is a slight weighting toward817
linguistic relatedness as opposed to pure spatial proximity. Next, we run818
a linear regression of four instrumental variables on the response variable of819
ownership lagged by the the weighted distance matrix. Our four instrumental820
variables are simply XiW , where Xi is one of our four parameters from our821
most efficient regression analysis above (warfare, fishing, population density822
interacted with net primary productivity and C.V. rainfall interacted with823
population density), and W is the combined weighted language and distance824
matrix. We save the vector of our unstandardised residuals from this OLS825
regression and then run the following logistic regression to account for spatial826
and network autocorrelation:827
ln(
pˆ
1− pˆ) = α + βWy +
∑
i
bixi + λv (3)
here β is the coefficient associated with the lagged endogenous binary own-828
ership variable; and λ is the coefficient associated with the vector of unstan-829
dardised residuals (v) obtained from the stage 1 OLS regression. This should830
result in coefficients associated with warfare, fishing, population density in-831
teracted with net primary productivity and population density interacted832
with C.V. rainfall that are not biased by autocorrelation processes (i.e., re-833
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gression errors that are asymptomatic and normally distributed) (see Dow,834
2008, p. 403). Our main results reported below are the output of the second835
stage regression, and we call these outputs our final regression outputs. A836
Moran’s I test for autocorrelation using our combined distance and language837
matrix on the residual deviances of the best regression model in the final838
output indicates that our endogenous lag variable successfully accounts for839
autocorrelation (I=0.001; p > 0.05).840
8. MAIN RESULTS841
Our final regression outputs illustrate two main findings.842
1. The data are more consistent with the common pool resource argument843
than the area reduction argument. This suggests that the emergence844
of social dilemmas is an under appreciated mechanism that favours845
the adoption of corporate territorial ownership, though not the only846
mechanism.847
2. There is a “legacy” effect apparent in the data set. Groups who share848
a common cultural history are more likely to recognize corporate own-849
ership. Further, there is a spatial dynamic in which groups who live850
near each other are more likely to recognize corporate ownership as the851
number of near-by groups who recognize such ownership increases.852
8.1. Independent effects853
Table 3 illustrates the mean coefficients, standard errors and summed854
Akaike weights associated with each variable and interaction term in the 95855
% confidence set of regression models in our final regression output. The856
endogenous lag variable for the presence and absence of a corporate owner-857
ship rule has a positive effect on the likelihood of ownership. This suggests858
that groups who share a common cultural history and are closer in space to859
groups who recognize corporate ownership are more likely to do so as well.860
Consistent with the area reduction argument and the common pool resource861
argument, warfare and the percent of diet obtained from fishing both have a862
positive effect on the likelihood of ownership. Finally, the residuals from the863
stage one OLS regression, which represent the deviance unexplained by cul-864
tural transmission and the ecological variables, have a negative effect on the865
likelihood of ownership. This suggests that there is, as yet, an unaccounted866
for process that negatively effects the likelihood that societies recognize cor-867
porate ownership.868
25
[Table 3]869
8.2. Interaction effects870
As noted in the methods section, effect plots are needed to interpret the871
effect of interacted variables on a response variable. Figure 1a illustrates that872
as population density increases, at a given value of C.V. rainfall, societies are873
more likely to recognize corporate ownership. Please note that the intercept874
of each “effect line” increases as the value of C.V. rainfall held constant in-875
creases. This indicates that as rainfall, and, by implication, the availability876
of terrestrial foods, gets more unpredictable, societies are more likely to rec-877
ognize a corporate ownership rule. This result is consistent with the common878
pool resource argument but is not consistent with the area reduction argu-879
ment. Figure 1b illustrates that, holding population density constant, net880
primary productivity has a negative effect on the likelihood of ownership.881
Moreover, the strength of the effect (the steepness of each respective curve882
on Figure 1b) increases as population density increases. This indicates that883
societies are less likely to recognize the corporate ownership of territory as884
resources get more dense, holding all else equal, and this is consistent with885
the common pool resource argument but not the area reduction argument.886
Finally, Figure 1b demonstrates that, once the deviance explained by the in-887
teraction of population density and C.V. rainfall is accounted for, population888
density has a negative effect on the likelihood of corporate ownership at a889
given level of net primary productivity. This is a pattern not explained by890
either the area reduction or common pool resource arguments.891
[Figure 1]892
8.3. The relative importance of variables893
Table 3 illustrates the summed Akaike weights of the variables in the 95894
% confidence set of regression models. This measure of importance allows895
us to examine which variables are most likely to determine the likelihood896
of ownership and, thus, make statements about which variables are most897
essential to explaining corporate ownership. With importance values of 1,898
the spatially lagged ownership variable, warfare and C. V. rainfall interacted899
with population density are the most essential variables in this data set to900
explain the likelihood of ownership. With summed weights of 0.72 and 0.58901
respectively, the percent of diet obtained from fishing and net primary pro-902
ductivity interacted with population density are 1.32 and 1.72 times less903
likely to effect ownership, respectively, than the three variables with weights904
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of 1. The implication of this result is that competition, uncertainty in the905
availability of resources and cultural transmission processes are more likely906
to effect ownership than the density of terrestrial resources, in this data set.907
Table 4 illustrates the deviance explained by each variable in the best908
regression model (i.e. the model with the lowest AIC). This table is another909
way to examine the importance of explanatory factors. Again, the data indi-910
cate that the endogenous, spatially lagged ownership variable, C. V. rainfall911
interacted with population density and warfare explain a large proportion of912
the deviance. Conversely, net primary productivity interacted with popula-913
tion density and fishing explain a low proportion of the deviance. The im-914
plication, again, is that changes in population density interacted with C.V.915
rainfall, warfare and cultural transmission have a larger and more certain916
effect on the likelihood of corporate ownership than population density in-917
teracted with net primary productivity and fishing.918
[Table 4]919
9. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION920
Our main gaol in this paper has been to compare two different arguments921
that might explain the evolution of corporate territorial ownership in hunter-922
gatherer societies with data. The critical results that tip the balance in923
favour of the common pool resource argument are: Holding all else constant,924
as terrestrial resources become less predictable and dense, hunter-gatherers925
are more likely to recognize corporate ownership (Figure 1). These findings926
are simply inconsistent with the area reduction argument. However, these927
patterns are consistent with the common pool resource argument. In this928
argument, forager-resource systems are sometimes characterized by multiple929
regimes, such as the productive and degraded harvest attractors described930
in the FEM section. The rapid and difficult to anticipate transition between931
such regimes in highly variable environments could provide a powerful incen-932
tive for individuals to adopt corporate territorial ownership (see predictions933
section). We argue that the development of common pool resource dilem-934
mas and the information processing costs associated with such dilemmas to935
schedule residential movements and reliably access habitats on a landscape is936
a neglected mechanism that favours investment in formal rules of territorial937
ownership (Wilson et al., 1994; Charnov et al., 1976). In short, the corpo-938
rate ownership of territory provides a public good by coordinating where and939
when individuals harvest resources, and contributing to this public good has940
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a net benefit for individuals when common pool resource dilemmas (caused941
by the emergence of multiple potential harvest regimes) characterize a ter-942
restrial resource base. The implication is that the net benefits of collective943
action to monitor, sanction and ritually integrate social groups rather than944
net benefits of defending a territory determined by the area that individuals945
need to find food is a more important constraint on the evolution of corporate946
territorial ownership.947
Clearly, our results also indicate that we have more to learn. We suggest948
three directions for future research. First, a provocative result of our analysis949
is the positive and independent association between warfare and corporate950
ownership. This relationship may occur because corporate ownership does951
little good without a commitment to defense, as suggested by the common952
pool resource argument. However, there is another mechanism that we spec-953
ulate could also account for this association.954
The formal notion of ownership institutions is likely to affect two things955
for individuals in the case of persistent warfare. 1) Ownership institutions956
generate boundary rules, in the language of Ostrom (2005), that enable indi-957
viduals to efficiently monitor and sanction territorial intruders. In this case,958
ownership is place-based, defines who is a member of a particular territorially959
defined group, and everyone knows who the outsiders are (for monitoring), as960
well as how to sanction them (attack them). 2) Corporate ownership could961
reduce the costs of warfare for individuals by facilitating “diplomatic” solu-962
tions or peace making (Kelly, 2000). In this case, social groups who agree963
to own a territory via collective action provide the public good of common964
defense and diplomatic relations with other potentially hostile groups. Given965
that simply moving when attacked is a costly option, warfare or persistent966
raiding could create a situation in which free riding by one individual (relying967
on others to provide defense) depletes the ability of a social group to provide968
for the common defense of a territory. In such a situation, it might pay for969
individuals to cooperate and recognize norms that define the corporate own-970
ership of territory. Groups who recognize such rules may then out-compete971
groups through population expansion who do not, expanding their territory972
due to their superior abilities to cooperate. This is the argument made by973
Bowles (2009) that warfare and ownership coevolve because warfare creates974
selective pressure for more effective cooperation at the level of the group (Ol-975
son, 1993). In any case, warfare may create a social dilemma that is distinct976
from a common pool resource dilemma in some situations. The need to pro-977
vide the public good of common defense or get pushed out of a territory may978
28
favour the evolution of corporate ownership.979
Second, our analysis indicates that, holding other social-ecological vari-980
ables equal, groups who share a common cultural history are more likely to981
recognize corporate ownership, and there is a spatial dynamic in which groups982
who live near each other are more likely to recognize corporate ownership as983
the number of near-by groups who recognize such ownership increases. Thus,984
both vertical and horizontal cultural transmission are implicated. This re-985
sult suggests the possibility that once corporate ownership is adopted, it may986
persist, even if ecological conditions change. From an archaeological stand-987
point this is intriguing. Once corporate ownership evolves, such rules may988
continue to affect the subsistence strategies of individuals, even if ecological989
conditions change in such a way that we might expect that the net benefits990
of corporate ownership decline. An important issue for further research is991
developing an understanding of the mechanisms that favour the horizontal992
and vertical transmission of corporate ownership rules and how these two993
processes operate in conjunction to partly determine variation in rules and994
norms of ownership (Towner et al., 2012).995
Finally, more work is needed to develop an understanding of ownership as996
nested sets of norms. Our results suggest that the area reduction argument997
does not explain corporate ownership as well as the common pool resource998
argument. However this does not mean the the model of economic defensi-999
bility is not useful. The MED makes two latent assumptions: 1) There is no1000
feedback between the harvest of resources and resource density in a territory1001
over time and 2) collective action is free. Our results indicate that these1002
assumptions are just too simple to understand the evolution of corporate1003
ownership. The MED might be quite useful, however, for understanding the1004
ownership of individual resources in which collective action is not required1005
to defend a resource and ownership decisions are made much faster than the1006
feedback between resource density and resource harvest operates. For in-1007
stance, principles of the MED have been used to understand investment in1008
hoarding (a kind of individual ownership) vs. sharing or tolerated scrounging1009
(Kelly, 2013; Blurton Jones, 1984) where the latent assumptions of the MED1010
are more likely to be met. Moving forward, we suggest that we need multiple1011
models to understand ownership as nested sets of norms.1012
9.1. Implications for the adoption of food production1013
Several important papers have recently argued that formal rules for ter-1014
ritorial ownership necessarily coevolve with the adoption of food production1015
29
(Bowles and Choi, 2013; Bettinger et al., 2009; Smith, 2012; Zeder, 2012).1016
This argument posits that only when ownership institutions are in place that1017
allow individuals to take a greater interest in futures gains does food pro-1018
duction also evolve in a population of foragers. For example, Smith (2012)1019
provocatively argues that the onset of the Holocene led to an increase in the1020
productivity of terrestrial resources and the establishment of resource rich1021
zones at mid-latitudes; in turn, this increase in the productivity of resources1022
contributed to declines in the size of territory needed by foragers to find food1023
and favoured investment in the ownership of territories by individual foragers1024
(Smith, 2012; Zeder, 2012). This argument is based on the model of economic1025
defensibility. An increase in terrestrial productivity deceases the amount of1026
territory that foragers need and creates an incentive for individuals to in-1027
vest in territorial ownership. Territorial ownership creates an incentive for1028
individuals to invest in food production because the ownership institutions1029
protect the fruits of agriculture from arbitrary expropriation and/or sharing1030
obligations (see also Bowles and Choi, 2013).1031
A critical result of our study relevant to this argument is that the corpo-1032
rate ownership of territories decreases as terrestrial resources become more1033
dense and/or predictable. The implication is that climate drivers that make1034
terrestrial resources more dense and predictable are not likely to increase1035
the benefits of territorial ownership for individual foragers, holding all else1036
equal. Rather, this situation is likely to create less incentive to formally own1037
territories, holding competition constant. Ownership and the adoption of1038
food production may very well coevolve, but how this process occurs needs1039
closer examination. Our study suggests that the emergence of social dilem-1040
mas rather than a reduction in the area necessary per forager to obtain food1041
is a more important mechanism that favours the evolution of territorial own-1042
ership.1043
The model of economic defensibility has organized how archaeologists1044
and ethnoarchaeologists study the evolution of territorial ownership for more1045
than 30 years. This has been a good thing. The model’s logic is compelling1046
and leads to a straightforward argument that we have called the area re-1047
duction argument. However, the area reduction argument has never been1048
compared with other arguments that might also explain the evolution of1049
corporate territorial ownership. In this paper, we have compared the area1050
reduction argument with an alternative that we call the common pool re-1051
source dilemma argument. The common pool resource argument is based on1052
the logic of a non-linear dynamical system that models the feedback between1053
30
foragers and resources. Our results are more consistent with the common1054
pool resource argument. As a consequence, we suggest that the costs of1055
collective action to monitor, sanction and ritually integrate social groups1056
are an under-appreciated constraint on the evolution of corporate territorial1057
ownership.1058
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Table 1: Variables and definitions
Variable Definition Estimated process Reference
Ownership The presence or absence of formal
territorial ownership
Ownership strategies Binford, 2001
Warfare Frequency of warfare Competition for resources Binford, 2001
Density Population density Competition for resources Binford, 2001
Fishing The percent of diet obtained from
aquatic resources
Density of resources Binford, 2001
NPP Net primary productivity (the
growth rate of biomass in
grams/m2/year−1)
Density of terrestrial
resources
Grieser et al., 2006
CV Rainfall The coefficient of variation of
inter-annual rainfall
Predictability of terrestrial
resources
Beck et al., 2004
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Table 3: Means, standard errors and relative importance (
∑
Akaike weight) of the ex-
planatory variables included in the 95 % confidence set of models. WOwnership=the
distance lagged ownership variable. V =vector of residual error from stage 1 regression.
Explanatory variable Coefficient (b) Std. Error Importance
Intercept -3.75 0.49 –
Warfare 0.64 0.12 1.00
Fishing 0.007 0.003 0.72
WOwnership 4.40 1.10 1.00
V -2.75 1.78 0.73
CV Rainfall : Density 0.10 0.004 1.00
NPP : Density -0.0004 0.0004 0.58
Table 4: The deviance explained by each variable in the best regression model (i.e., the
model with the lowest AIC). Df=degrees of freedom; Deviance=deviance explained by
a variable in the regression model. *parameter explains more deviance than would be
expected by chance alone at the p.05 level.
Df Deviance Resid. Df Resid. Dev
NULL 338 469.60
WOwnership∗ 1 137.87 337 331.73
V ∗ 1 15.00 336 316.72
Warfare∗ 1 27.19 335 289.53
Fishing∗ 1 4.22 334 285.30
CV Rainfall : Density∗ 1 18.10 333 267.20
Density : NPP 1 2.60 332 264.60
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Figure 1: (a)-The effect of population density on the probability of ownership controlling
for C.V. Rainfall. The red solid line-C.V. Rainfall is held constant at 0.1; green dashed
line-0.2; blue long-dashed line-0.3; and the purple dotted line-0.4. (b)-The effect of net
primary productivity on the probability of ownership while holding population density
equal. Solid red line-population density is held equal at 5; gold dashed line-15, green
dotted line-30, light blue medium dashed line-60, dark blue long-dashed line-120; and
purple dashed-dot line-240. 40
